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A. The World of Small Business Reorganization'
Extensive anecdotal evidence' and the limited empirical data
available3 suggest that the majority of chapter 11 business
© 2002. Professor of Law, University of Hawai'i School of Law.
1. This Article focuses only on small businesses in reorganization, not those
in liquidation.
2- See, e.g., Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 181, 185 (2000)
(stating that small businesses "constitute the overwhelming majority of business
bankruptcies"); Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11 - Does One Size Fit All?, 4 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167, 173 (1996) (criticizing the 1973 Bankruptcy
Commission Report for failing to give proper attention to small or closely held
businesses, which constituted a majority of bankruptcy cases at that time);
Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical
Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J.
509, 527 (2000) (stating "the bulk of the bankruptcy courts' caseload is comprised
of [sic] personal and small business bankruptcies"); Bruce A. Markell, LaSalle
and the Little Guy: Some Initial Musings on the Ultimate Impact of Bank of
America, NT & SA v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 16 BANKR. DEV. J.
345, 346 (2000) (noting that many bankruptcy cases are filed by small businesses
or individuals).
3. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and
Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 847, 849
(1994) (finding that more than seventy-one percent of bankruptcy cases are small
business cases); TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF
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reorganization cases are "small business" cases, however that
phrase might be defined.
SMALL BUSINESSES AND REASONS FOR THEIR FAILURE 3, 11, 12 (1998), available
at http://www.sba.gov/ADVO/research/rs188tot.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2002)
(stating "the great majority of companies in bankruptcy are small businesses" and
"our data show that the business bankruptcy process is dominated by small
businesses;" citing a 1994 study which found the median total assets of bankrupt
businesses in fourteen districts was $94,757); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 499, 500, 543 (1999) (finding that if Congress were to define small
businesses to include businesses with non-contingent liabilities of five million
dollars or less, more than ninety percent of current cases would be small business
cases); see also NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY:
THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 609-60 (E. Warren, Rep., 1997) [hereinafter NBRC
REPORT] (recommending reforms designed to reduce the time and cost of
chapter 11 for small businesses); Alexander L. Paskay & Frances Pilaro
Wolstenholme, Chapter 11: A Growing Cash Cow, Some Thoughts on How to
Rein in the System, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 346-46 (1993) (arguing the
conclusion that most cases are small business "requires no empirical
evidence ....").
4. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 2, at 188-93 (evaluating various methods of
defining "small business"); Joshua E. Husbands, The Elusive Meaning of "Small
Business," 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 355 (1998) (noting the divergent
definitions of "small business" in various statutes applicable to "small
businesses," and noting that classification depends upon purpose and is based
upon various factors including asset value, number of employees, and annual
revenue); Linda Ekstrom Stanley, Small Business Bankruptcy Reform: Codifying
Our Best Practices, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 20, 20 (July/Aug. 1998) (noting that
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission considered a proposal to define
small business in terms of income, but adopted a debt-based definition; defining
small business as one with non-contingent liabilities of five million dollars or less;
noting that between eighty-five and ninety percent of chapter 11 cases would
meet this definition); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 WIs.
L. REV. 729, 751 n.88 (1993) (noting that Judge Small selects small business cases
for his fast track program "based upon the sizes of the debts [held by the
debtor's] twenty largest creditors;" citing telephone interview with Judge Small);
NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 68 (defining "small business" as having
aggregate, non-contingent, liquidated, secured or unsecured debts as of the
petition date of not more than five million dollars).
The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code defined "small business"
as "a person engaged in commercial or business activities (but does not include a
person whose primary activity is the business of owning or operating real
property and activities incidental thereto) whose aggregate non-contingent
liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the petition do not
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Many bankruptcy experts suspect that the substantial costs and
hurdles of reorganizing under chapter 11 are especially
burdensome for small businesses and may significantly impair
small businesses' ability to reorganize and survive Again, the
exceed $2,000,000." 11 U.S.C. § 101(51C) (2000). This definition applies to those
provisions of current bankruptcy law that apply only to small businesses.
Bankruptcy Code section 1102 authorizes the court to order that a creditors'
committee not be appointed in a small business case; Bankruptcy Rule 1020
allows a business that meets the small business definition to elect to be treated as
a small business; Bankruptcy Code sections 1121(e) and 1125(f) and Bankruptcy
Rule 3017.1 provide expedited plan and disclosure statement procedures for
small businesses that take the election. Id. §§ 1102, 1121(e), 1125(f); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1020, 3017.1.
When bankruptcy experts speak of small businesses in bankruptcy, they
often use the phrase generically to distinguish such cases from "large" or "mega"
cases. For purposes of this Article, a business will be considered a small business
if it meets any of the foregoing definitions.
5. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 2, at 176-77 (arguing that the "one size fits all"
approach of chapter 11 is generally effective; noting that Judge Small has
simplified disclosure statements and expedited the confirmation process in a
successful effort to reduce the costs of chapter 11 cases for small businesses);
Christopher Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance
in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 104 (1998) (arguing that
corporate governance problems of businesses in bankruptcy are exacerbated in
small cases because creditors have so little at stake that traditional methods of
controlling strategic behavior (creditors' committees, termination of debtor
exclusivity, motions to convert or appoint a trustee) are impractical; arguing that
in small cases no one has the time or incentive to monitor management); Karen
L. Gilman, Code Review Commission's Proposals Spark Controversy, BANKR.
STRATEGIST, Sept. 1997, at 4 (acknowledging that small businesses need a more
cost effective system that would allow them to spend less time in bankruptcy;
assessing the proposals in light of this goal); Donald R. Korobkin, Vulnerability,
Survival, and the Problem of Small Business Bankruptcy, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 413,
423-28, 431 (1994) (arguing that the small percentage - fifteen to twenty-five - of
small businesses that emerge from bankruptcy as going concerns may arise from
under-capitalization, high debt-to-equity ratio, heavy reliance on short-term
financing, sensitivity to external changes such as economic recession, and being in
desperate condition when the case is filed); Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 851-52
(finding that "the costs of small business bankruptcies do not follow the pattern
of costs in large business bankruptcies" and explaining why the costs of chapter
11 are more burdensome for small businesses); Elliot D. Levin, Comments and
Responses to Small-Business Working Group Proposals, 102 CoM. L.J. 200, 204
(1997) (arguing that small businesses lack the financial resources and staff needed
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to survive the lengthy and complicated chapter 11 process); LoPucki, supra note
4, at 728, 730 n.6, 749-52 (finding that between 1964 and 1997, the median time in
chapter 11 increased by 150% for all entities, but did not increase for large,
publicly held companies; concluding that the Bankruptcy Code decreased the
time and cost of reorganization for the very largest entities but increased the time
and cost of reorganization for most entities; recommending separate procedures
for cases other than very large public companies; noting recurring problems in
small business cases, including non-existent or inactive creditors' committees,
difficulty retaining customers during bankruptcy and convincing suppliers to
continue doing business with debtors); Paskay & Wolstenholme, supra note 3 at
335-41 (1993) (citing professional fees and litigation costs as reasons chapter 11 is
so expensive); Stephen W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 288-89, 307-15 (1993)
(identifying causes of delay and expense in chapter 11 cases); Myron M.
Scheinfeld, Small Businesses and Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies, 41 PRAC.
LAW. 17, 18 (1995) (arguing that small business bankruptcy is too long, costly and
complicated, that creditors are uninvolved, and that debtors are left to guide
themselves through the process); A. Thomas Small, Small Business Bankruptcy
Cases, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 305, 305-06, 317 (1993) (arguing that chapter
11 is "synonymous with unnecessary delay" and expense; arguing that less
complex reorganizations should be expedited; arguing that delay harms creditors
because time is money, harms debtors through uncertainty, expense, stigma, and
court control over assets, and harms the system because languishing cases impair
efficiency); Deborah L. Thorne, The Bankruptcy Reform Act. For the General
Practitioner, CBA REC., Apr. 9, 1995, at 32 (arguing that the 1994 Bankruptcy
Reform amendments increased the time and cost of chapter 11 for small
businesses).
Small businesses have few reorganization options other than chapter 11.
Out of bankruptcy workouts often are not feasible. See Stuart Gilson et al.,
Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of
Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 325 (1990); see also Korobkin, supra note
5, at 428 n.56 (noting that the limited evidence available suggests that "small
businesses may be less successful than larger ones at relieving financial distress by
means of out of court workouts"); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control
- Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 99, 99-101, 114-17 (1983) (finding, in an empirical study of chapter 11 cases
filed in one district during the first year of the Bankruptcy Code, that out of court
workouts played no part in any of the cases; concluding that workouts are too
cumbersome or subject to control by dissenting minorities). Chapter 13 may
provide an alternative to chapter 11 for some individuals engaged in business, but
it is not available if the business is not an "individual" or if the business has
unsecured debt exceeding $290,525 or secured debt exceeding $871,550 (as of
Apr. 1, 2001).
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2000) (as adjusted by Notice Dated Feb. 20, 2001, Judicial
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limited empirical data available seem to support this notion.'
It should not be surprising, then, that bankruptcy practitioners,
scholars, and judges agonize over the treatment of small businesses
in reorganization; conferences are organized to consider the
particular problems of financially distressed small businesses;8
Congress singled out small businesses for attention in the 1994
Bankruptcy Code amendments;9 and the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission recommended reforms applicable to small
business reorganization cases."
Conference of the United States, 66 F.R. 10910); see also id. § 104(b)(1)
(providing for adjustment of dollar amounts).
6. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 4, at 731-32, 744-46 (citing studies that
indicate the adoption of chapter 11 has significantly increased the median length
of reorganization cases, and small business reorganizations proceed at roughly
the same pace as large ones).
7. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence Ponoroff,
The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of
the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74
AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 219-20 (2000) (advocating individual case management by
judges to accommodate the needs of small businesses in chapter 11); A. Thomas
Small, Suggestions for the National Bankruptcy Review Commission: Small
Business Reorganization Chapter, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 550, 550 (1996)
(advocating a separate reorganization chapter for small businesses).
& See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, BUILDING THE
FOUNDATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE 1995 WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE ON SMALL BUSINESS (1996), available at
http://www.whcsb.org/fropen.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
9. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 217, 108 Stat.
4106, 4127, codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1121, 1125 (2000); see also sources cited
supra note 5 (discussing the small business provisions added by the 1994
amendments).
The legislation that passed both houses of Congress this session (107th
Congress, first session, 2001) is focused predominantly (although far from
exclusively) on consumer bankruptcy and does little to target small business
reorganization per se. See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001); The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001).
10. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 609-60. The National Bankruptcy
Conference also considered (but rejected) proposals for separate treatment of
small businesses. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REFORMING THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: FINAL REPORT (1994), available at
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Much of the debate concerning the treatment of small
businesses in bankruptcy swirls around the decision embraced by
the drafters of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code to unite diverse business
relief chapters into the current chapter 11." As a consequence of
this one-size-fits-all approach, small, closely-held businesses face
the same complicated reorganization processes as large, publicly
held businesses." Although few would openly advocate a return to
the type of strategic behavior that characterized the superceded
Bankruptcy Act's segregation of "corporate reorganizations" and
"arrangements" under former chapters X and XI, 3 many would
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/NBC/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
11. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 2, at 170-75 (describing the evolution of
bankruptcy reorganization from two chapters into a single unified chapter for all
sizes and types of businesses); Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda for
Reform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573, 574 (1995) (arguing that the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code erred in adopting a "one size fits all" approach to business
reorganization); Paskay & Wolstenholme, supra note 5, at 332 (noting that, with
chapter 11, Congress established a single chapter for all reorganizations); David
A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 465, 510-20 (1993) (arguing that the existence of separate
reorganization chapters under the Bankruptcy Act was a "colossal failure;"
noting that chapter 11 did not distinguish between different types of debtors;
advocating separate chapters for closely held and non-closely held businesses to
alleviate the burdens on small businesses in bankruptcy); Charles J. Tabb, The
Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REv. 791, 815-16 (1993) (noting that the debate
over establishing a separate chapter for small businesses suggests a return to the
old two-chapter system for business bankruptcy).
For a discussion of the changes implemented by the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code, see generally Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy
Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 941 (1979); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
12 See LoPucki, supra note 11, at 573-78. Because there is only one
reorganization chapter, it follows that every business files under that chapter.
13. Congress intended that small debtors would file reorganization
proceedings under chapter XI and large, publicly held debtors would file under
chapter X. See Linda J. Rusch, Single Asset Cases and Chapter 11: The
Classification Quandary, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 43, 54 (1993). Because
chapter X required the appointment of a trustee while chapter XI permitted the
debtor to remain in possession, even large businesses chose to reorganize under
chapter XI in order to avoid relinquishing control of the business to a trustee. See
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 7-1104 (2000) (noting that
[s]ince the appointment of a receiver was the exception rather than the rule
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advocate reforms that modify the one-size-fits-all treatment of
small businesses.
14
Reform proposals range from (i) doing nothing and allowing
chapter l's elegant flexibility to accommodate the needs of small
businesses in reorganization," (ii) encouraging bankruptcy courts
to accommodate small business cases through specialized case
management procedures, and amend the Bankruptcy Rules and
Bankruptcy Code in minor ways if necessary to facilitate these
procedures,'6 (iii) creating a separate reorganization chapter for
under chapter XI, while appointment of a trustee was mandated by chapter X,
management of insolvent corporations, even those with outstanding publicly
held debt or equity securities, sought to avoid chapter X and to instead bring
their cases under chapter XI.);
Susan Jensen-Conklin, Financial Reporting by Chapter 11 Debtors: An
Introduction to Statement of Position 90-7, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 16-1.7 (1992)
(noting that a debtor had little control under chapter X of the former Bankruptcy
Act because a trustee was appointed in every case and only the trustee could
propose a plan; stating that administration of chapter X cases was time-
consuming and complicated); Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter
11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and
Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431
(1995) (comparing Bankruptcy Act chapter X, in which a trustee was appointed
in every case to operate the business and formulate a plan, to chapter XI, in
which the debtor in possession generally retained control of the business; noting
that debtors avoided filing Chapter X and that even large, publicly held
businesses reorganized under chapter XI, which was meant for small, closely-held
businesses, in order to avoid the appointment of a trustee under chapter X;
finding that less than ten percent of business reorganizations occurred under
chapter X; noting that chapter XI's debtor in possession concept carried over to
the current Bankruptcy Code, which maintains a strong presumption that the
debtor should remain in control of the business).
14. See David B. Young & Jeff Bohm, Small Business and Single Asset Real
Estate Reorganization Issues, 788 PLI/CoMM. 447, 453-59 (1999).
15. See, e.g., NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 307-11
(arguing that a separate reorganization chapter for small businesses is not
warranted because there is insufficient evidence that chapter 11 is too confusing,
costly, and time consuming and because a separate reorganization chapter will
not resolve the problems of small businesses in chapter 11).
16. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 2, at 189-200 (recommending retaining one-
size-fits-all chapter 11 with improved judicial training and judicial control of small
business cases to maintain flexibility); Small, supra note 5, at 305 (proposing "fast
track" judicially implemented case management processes for certain cases,
particularly small business cases; explaining how the then-current Bankruptcy
259
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small businesses, or otherwise amending the Bankruptcy Code in
significant ways to make chapter 11 easier for small
businesses, 7and (iv) amending the Bankruptcy Code to make
chapter 11 harder for small businesses in order to force the
liquidation of businesses that are not viable. 8
B. SABRE: The Select Advisory Committee on Business
Reorganization
In March 2000, Mike Sigal, Chair of the American Bar
Association Business Bankruptcy Committee, appointed Gerald K.
Smith to chair a special committee of the Section of Business Law,
Business Bankruptcy Committee, to be known as the Select
Advisory Committee on Business Reorganization ("SABRE"). 9
SABRE's mission is to consider the perception that chapter 11
business reorganizations take too long and cost too much and, if
appropriate, to develop legislative solutions to reduce the time and
cost of business reorganizations.' Although SABRE was
Code and Bankruptcy Rules permitted such procedures).
17. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993, S. 540, 103d Cong. (1993)
(proposing an experimental chapter 10, in which a plan could be confirmed
without a creditor vote and a case could proceed without a creditors' committee
for small businesses with debts of $2.5 million or less); Paskay & Wolstenholme,
supra note 5, at 342-45 (discussing "fast-track" process and proposed chapter 10
for small businesses; recommending legislative reforms rather than simple
judicial case management procedures); Small, supra note 5, at 319-20
(recommending amendments to chapter 11 to accommodate small businesses, or
separate chapter 10 for small businesses); cf. Skeel, supra note 11, at 465
(recommending separate reorganization chapters for closely held and non-closely
held businesses).
18. NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 610, 623 (suggesting that the court, upon
request of a party in interest or the U.S. Trustee, after notice and hearing, and for
cause shown, convert or dismiss a small business case, whatever is in the best
interest of the parties); see also Business Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, S.
1914, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced Apr. 2, 1998) (proposing, essentially,
adoption of the NBRC proposals).
19. Messrs. Smith and Sigal appointed the author of this Article as SABRE
Reporter and member, and appointed SABRE members Hon. Burton Lifland,
Hon. Ralph Mabey, Hon. Joseph (Jerry) Patchan, Michael St. Patrick Baxter, and
G. Eric Brunstad. Mr. Sigal and Hugh Ray are ex officio members.
20. SABRE's proposals do not directly address questions concerning the
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organized to examine the time and cost of reorganization under
chapter 11 generally, it has carefully considered how its proposals
might affect businesses of varying sizes and types, including small
businesses.2
In March 2001, following extensive investigation and analysis,
and consultation with the members of the Business Bankruptcy
Committee Council and other bankruptcy experts, SABRE issued
its First Report.' The First Report elaborates three specific reform
proposals designed to address specifically identified aspects of
chapter 11 practice that may unnecessarily increase the cost and
time of business reorganizations.' The proposals are targeted
toward underlying problems as to which SABRE identified accord
among bankruptcy experts.24
The elaboration and analysis of these proposals, which is set
forth in the First Report, is not repeated here. Rather, this Article
(i) briefly considers how the proposals set forth in SABRE's First
Report might affect small business reorganizations, and (ii)
introduces a draft proposal under consideration by SABRE that
may be of particular application in small business reorganization
cases. For each of these proposals, this Article considers the extent
to which bankruptcy judges and practitioners might implement the
SABRE proposals even in the absence of new legislation or rules.
efficacy of chapter 11, including topics such as confirmation rates, re-filing rates,
or differences in chapter 11 statistics among judicial districts.
21. SELECI ADVISORY COMMITEE ON BUSINESS REORGANIZATION, FIRST
REPORT OF THE SELECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS
REORGANIZATION, 57 Bus. LAW. 163, 166-69, 213-14 (Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti,
Reporter, 2001) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
22. Id.; see also SELECT ADVISORY COMMITFEE ON BUSINESS
REORGANIZATION, ANNOTATED LIST OF RESOURCES, 57 Bus. LAW. 245 (Karen
M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Reporter, 2001).
23. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21.
24. Id. at 166-69. SABRE avoided topics on which bankruptcy experts
disagree concerning the underlying causes.
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II. THE FIRST REPORT OF THE SELECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
BUSINESS REORGANIZATION
A. Small Businesses and Federal Workout Proceedings
SABRE Proposal:
FEDERAL WORKOUT PROCEEDING. Foster out of
bankruptcy resolutions of some business and economic
difficulties by establishing a federal statutory mechanism that
stays creditors from enforcing their claims and prevents the
debtor from making extraordinary asset transfers during a short
workout period.25
A federal workout proceeding ("FWP") is commenced 26 when
the debtor and substantial, unaffiliated creditors jointly file a
workout petition in federal bankruptcy court. An FWP embodies
three essential elements:
(i) It provides a federally imposed stay that prevents
enforcement actions by creditors (similar to the automatic stay
in bankruptcy) and prevents dissipation of assets by the debtor,
for a short period, to permit negotiation so that business
solutions rather than judicial intervention might solve business
and financial problems. The stay, including any extensions, may
not exceed 120 days.
(ii) In order to validate the debtor's intention to attempt an out
of bankruptcy workout, prevent abuse, and verify that at least
some substantial creditors are willing to work with the debtor
toward a workout, an FWP may be commenced only by the
debtor plus some substantial, unaffiliated creditors.
(iii) The FWP provides a vehicle for consensual debt
restructuring. As with out of court workouts, the debtor and
25. Id. at 169-85.
26. For simplicity, this Article discusses the proposals in the present tense, as
if enacted, rather than in the future tense.
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individual creditors may modify the terms of their contracts by
agreement. The FWP does not, however, allow the debtor to
impose terms on dissenting creditors and it does not provide a
mechanism by which a majority can bind the minority. If a
debtor wishes to modify a particular creditor's claim or contract
without that creditor's consent, the debtor must file a
bankruptcy case and attempt to modify the claim or contract
under the strictures of the Bankruptcy Code.r
This Proposal, elaborated in the First Report, is designed to
"foster out of bankruptcy resolutions of some business and
economic difficulties and avoid a bankruptcy filing by establishing
a federal statutory mechanism that stays creditors from
enforcement and the debtor from out-of-the-ordinary course asset
transfers during a short workout period.,
28
The FWP is expected to be particularly useful in cases in which
the debtor and substantial creditors are on the verge of achieving
an out of court restructuring, but a single creditor or small number
of creditors threatens to take precipitous action that would make
such an agreement impossible.29 For example, foreclosure or the
imposition of a lien could thwart negotiations that contemplate
new secured credit sufficient to allow the debtor to satisfy or re-
finance the dissenter's underlying claim, pay other creditors under
agreed (perhaps extended) terms, and remain in operation.
Although SABRE expects both large and small businesses to
file FWPs, and the FWP certainly holds great promise for large
businesses, it may be especially useful to small businesses. The
essential characteristics of the FWP - its simplicity, short duration,
flexibility, and reduced costs in comparison to chapter 11' - are
critically valuable to small businesses, which often lack the
resources and resiliency that might allow larger businesses to
weather a lengthy chapter 11 case.
Moreover, even if the FWP does not result in a consensual
workout, it nevertheless might be a critical precursor to a pre-
27. FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 169-70. The description of the FWP to
this point is drawn virtually word for word from the FIRST REPORT. Id.
28. See id. at 169.
29. Id. at 171.
30. Id. at 179.
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packaged or pre-negotiated31 chapter 11 filing. Many analysts
believe that pre-packaged chapter 11 cases can dramatically reduce
the time and cost of chapter 11, in particular, and of restructuring,
in general." To date, however, few, if any, small business debtors
31. The FWP may provide an adequate opportunity to negotiate terms, even
if it does not provide sufficient time for disclosure and voting. In that case, a pre-
petition negotiated, post-petition voted plan may still dramatically increase the
small business's chances for success in chapter 11. Cf Elizabeth Tashjian et al.,
Prepacks: An Empirical Analysis of Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN. ECON.
135 (1996) (including both pre-petition voted and post-petition voted plans in an
analysis of "pre-packaged" chapter 11 cases).
32 See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CHAPTER
11 VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES 39-40 (1997) (concluding that
the "academic consensus" is that pre-packaged cases cost more than out of court
workouts but less than full chapter 11 cases); see also David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL.
L. REv. 1, 27-29 (1998) (arguing that Delaware venue solves the delay problem
because cases are resolved faster there (many are pre-packs)); Conrad B.
Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 347, 347-48,
352-53 (1993) (arguing that an out of court workout can avoid the costs, delay,
and aggravation of a litigious chapter 11; suggesting that the lower cost of an out
of court workout increases the potential "slice-of-pie" available for creditors);
Gilson et al., supra note 5, at 319 (citing SOLSTEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS:
INSIDE CHAPTER 11: AN EXPOSE (1989)) (noting that it is widely believed that
the direct costs of chapter 11 are higher than the direct costs of private
negotiation because the complexity and procedural demands of chapter 11
increase attorneys' fees; adding that chapter 11 may also increase indirect costs
such as management time devoted to restructuring); Randolph J. Haines,
Defense, Discipline, Debtors: Bankrupting the Opposition, LITIG., Summer 1995,
at 38, 40 (arguing that out of court workouts are beneficial to creditors because
"out of court workouts, even if they mean accepting pennies on the dollar, are
usually quicker and cheaper than any bankruptcy, and therefore likely to return
more to creditors"); Bettina M. Whyte & Patricia D. Tilton, Turnarounds:
Pursuing A Dual Path, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (1995) (stating that
generally, "an out of court workout is preferable to reorganizing under the Code
due to the cost, image, drain on resources, impact on morale, etc. of a
bankruptcy"); cf. Tashjian, supra note 31, at 153-55 (concluding that creditors
were more willing to accept a pre-packaged filing on the same terms as an out of
court workout because all other creditors would be bound in a pre-packaged
filing but not in the workout). But see Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The
Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical
Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REv. 231, 251-53, 264 (2001)
(noting that pre-packaged cases are faster to confirm and entail lower direct costs
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have filed pre-packaged chapter 11 cases.3 By providing a setting
in which the debtor and its creditors can negotiate a pre-packaged
plan without concern that any party will take precipitous action,
the FWP may enable small business debtors and their creditors to
take advantage of a potentially useful restructuring process rarely
used by small businesses today.
Finally, because an FWP cannot be filed without substantial
creditor consent,' the FWP may benefit all parties in both large
and small business cases by promptly informing them whether the
debtor has a realistic prospect of achieving a viable plan likely to
garner adequate support among and acceptance by creditors. This
realism is particularly important in small business situations in
which creditors often lose time, money, and effort when small
business debtors optimistically file a reorganization case that
ultimately is dismissed or converted to liquidation. 5
chapter 11 but cases confirmed in Delaware and New York, fail at much higher
rates than cases confirmed in other jurisdictions (thirty-three percent re-filing
rate in Delaware and New York as compared to seven percent in other
jurisdictions); stating that Delaware courts have a tendency to abdicate statutory
obligations to gauge the feasibility of a pre-packaged plan and instead approve
them "no questions asked").
Despite possible abuses of the pre-packaged reorganization process, it
seems that pre-packaged reorganization cases, when used properly and in good
faith, can dramatically reduce the time and cost of bankruptcy. See generally
Tashjian, supra note 31, at 141-46, 155 (providing the results of an empirical study
analyzing "the attributes and outcomes of the restructuring process for a sample
of forty-nine financially distressed firms that restructured by means of a
prepackaged bankruptcy"). But see Brian L. Betker, An Empirical Examination
of Prepackaged Bankruptcy, FIN. MGMT., Mar. 1, 1995, at 3 (suggesting that there
is little actual difference between pre-packs and traditional chapter 11 cases when
the pre- and post-petition time and cost are taken into account); see also Lubben,
supra note 2, at 516 (comparing the Tashjian, Weise, and Betker studies); Karen
E. Wagner, Representing a Business Debtor, 633 PLI/CoMM. 7, 50-51 (1992)
(arguing, without empirical data, that pre-packaged reorganization can take years
and may increase costs).
33. See Gilson et al., supra note 5, at 324-25.
34. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 169-70, 173 (stating that the term
"substantial" is to be "measured, in the court's discretion, by reference to the
number, percentage, and nature of the creditors, including whether the debtor's
major creditor(s) support or oppose the filing").
35. See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 423-25 (arguing that management failure
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The FWP is a new, unique, and unparalleled mechanism. Its
fundamental concept - a stay of out-of-the-ordinary course actions
by both creditors and the debtor - is unprecedented.36
Consequently, unlike some of the other proposals discussed herein,
it cannot be implemented without new, federal legislation.37
Even in the absence of legislation, however, a small business
might draw upon the essential principles of the FWP in an effort to
gain some measure of the FWP's benefits. A business could do so
through negotiation by proposing that the holdout creditors agree
to a short moratorium on enforcement if the debtor agrees to a
coterminous moratorium on out-of-the-ordinary course transfers.3"
to file chapter 11 until the business is too distressed to be saved may explain why
only fifteen to twenty-five percent of small businesses emerge successfully from
chapter 11); Levin, supra note 5, at 200 (stating:
[T]he principal reason for the low success rate in small chapter 11 cases is that
many debtors' businesses have no realistic prospects for reorganization from
the moment they are filed, and that many remain in chapter 11 for extended
periods of time even though the debtor has not filed a plan of reorganization
and even though the debtor is unlikely to be able to confirm a plan of
reorganization.).
36. FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 169. There is currently no federal
mechanism other than the automatic stay that allows a debtor to impose a
moratorium on creditors' collection activities. Similarly, no federal statute allows
creditors to prevent a debtor from dissipating assets during the course of
negotiations. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that a federal court could
not use its equitable powers to prevent a debtor from dissipating assets in the
absence of a federal statute. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance
Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999) (concluding that federal courts' equity
power does not extend to granting an injunction preventing a debtor from
disposing of assets pending adjudication of an unsecured creditor's contract
claim; reasoning that "[tihe debate concerning this formidable power over
debtors should be conducted and resolved where such issues belong in our
democracy: in the Congress"); see also FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 169-85.
37. SABRE is in the process of drafting such legislation for consideration and
comment by interested persons prior to submission to Congress.
38. FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 169-85. The FIRST REPORT indicates
that a definition distinguishing between ordinary course and of out-of-the-
ordinary course transactions will be provided in the statute. For example, the
grant of security for extensions of new credit and the payment of employee wages
and other operating expenses would constitute ordinary course transactions, but
the grant of security for antecedent debt would not. Id. at 170.
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B. Plan Facilitators in Small Business Reorganization Cases
SABRE Proposal:
INDEPENDENT FACILITATOR. In appropriate
circumstances, after a reasonable period of time has passed
during which the parties are unable to reach consensus on a
plan, the court may appoint an independent facilitator to foster
consensus. If facilitated negotiations fail to produce a plan, the
court may permit the facilitator to file a plan, subject to the
usual voting and confirmation requirements, and to parties'
objections and requests to modify. 9
In appropriate circumstances, at any time after 120 days after
the commencement of a case (without regard to whether the
debtor's exclusive period to file a plan has expired or been
enlarged), the court, sua sponte or at the request of any party in
interest, may order the appointment of a plan facilitator to foster
consensus. 4 If facilitated negotiations fail, the facilitator, with
court approval, may develop and file a plan.'
Appropriate circumstances include any or all of the following,
without limitation:
" appointment is in the best interests of the debtor and the
creditors
" appointment may facilitate or expedite reorganization
" the parties are at impasse
" passage of time since filing
* no plan has been filed
" no plan is likely to be confirmed soon.
This Proposal, elaborated in the First Report, is designed to
address the difficulty of achieving consensus in a litigious
39. FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 185.
40. Id. at 185-86.
41. Id.
4Z Id. The description of the Independent Facilitator to this point is drawn,
virtually word for word, from the FIRST REPORT.
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environment.43 It employs a neutral facilitator to foster consensus
and break through impasse if the parties are unable to agree on the
essential structure of a plan within a reasonable period."
Traditional mediators have been employed in several large
chapter 11 cases to foster consensus and resolve impasse in plan
negotiations. 5 The facilitator proposal differs from traditional
mediation primarily in its contemplation that a neutral facilitator
may be granted the ability to file a plan. ' The rationale for this
extraordinary power is discussed in the First Report.'7
Not surprisingly, this proposal was inspired by several large,
drawn out, acrimonious chapter 11 cases in which high profile
mediators were appointed to reconcile the parties' intractable
disagreements. ' The proposal is expected to expand and enhance
the use of facilitation in large cases. Yet, the prospects of
facilitation for small business cases are particularly enticing.
Legitimate disputes over issues such as valuation, distribution,
and management certainly can and do cause lengthy negotiations
in any chapter 11 case.49 Because small businesses tend to have
fewer resources and less flexibility than large businesses, however,
small businesses may collapse under the cost of sustaining the
administrative costs and business stresses of an unnecessarily
protracted chapter 11 case. Thus, the consequences of protracted
negotiations may be more severe for small businesses. Moreover,
small businesses are particularly vulnerable to rancorous
negotiations spurred by a single creditor (or a small number of
creditors) whose position is founded more on animosity toward the
debtor and its principals than on objective economics. Small
businesses are also often plagued by the need to negotiate with
multiple creditors separately because of the absence of an
43. Id.
44. Id. at 167.
45. For examples, see id. at 188-89.
46. See id. at 185.
47. See id. at 188-202 (arguing that the policy reasons underlying the 1978
Bankruptcy Code decision to eliminate trustees and allow debtors to continue to
run their businesses, do not necessarily also justify giving the debtor full control
of the reorganization process).
48. For examples, see FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 188-89.
49. See id. at 185-93.
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organized, functioning, creditors' committee. The absence of an
organized, thoughtfully advised creditor voice may create perverse
incentives in which both debtor and creditors engage in a game of
"chicken" by threatening potentially fatal delay in an effort to
force the other party to accept concessions. For all of these
reasons, small business cases may be particularly well suited to
facilitation.
Small business chapter 11 presents unique hurdles, however, in
identifying appropriate facilitators. The facilitator's ability to
garner the respect of the parties is a significant factor in the success
of chapter 11 mediation or facilitation.' In the mega-chapter 11
cases in which mediation has grabbed headlines,"' this respect has
flowed from the mediator's national prominence. 2 A moderately
50. See In re R.H. Macy & Co., 152 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also
Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 12 OHIo ST. J. DIsp. RESOL. 37, 68 (1996); Cyrus Vance, Final Report
of Cyrus R. Vance, As Mediator, Pursuant to the Standing Mediation Order and
the Mediation Order Entered in the Macy's Reorganization Cases (Dec. 8, 1994)
(on file with Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law); Hugh M. Ray, Jr.,
Mediators, Egos and Common Courtesy, TEX. LAW., Mar. 14, 1994, at 22;
Eurotunnel Joue la Carte Des Mandataires Ad Hoc et des Actionnaires, LES
ECHOS, 13 Fevrier, 1996; Eurotunnel S'en Remet a Deux Arbitres de Poids, LES
ECHOS, 13 Fevrier, 1996.
51. See, e.g., Terry Brennan, Judge Approves Indesco Plan, DAILY DEAL,
Jan. 10, 2002 (discussing use of mediation in Indesco bankruptcy); McDermott
International Reports Fourth Quarter and Year-End Earnings for 2000, Bus.
WIRE, Feb. 23, 2001 (discussing appointment of a mediator in the Babcock &
Wilcox Company bankruptcy); Southern Northern States Accept Plan to Buy
Cajan Electric, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 4, 1999 ("U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven
Felsenthal of Dallas, who has acted as mediator in the [Cajan Electric
Cooperative] case, made the proposal to allow Cajan to emerge from chapter 11
bankruptcy after five years in court. The case is believed to be one of the longest
running in bankruptcy court history."); see also In re R.H. Macy & Co., 152 B.R.
869.
52. In In re R.H. Macy & Co., 152 B.R. 869, a large, complex, chapter 11
case, Judge Burton R. Lifland appointed former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance,
to mediate plan negotiations. Mr. Vance succeeded in mediating a plan that was
confirmed. Although Mr. Vance filed a report concerning the ultimate
settlement, the negotiation process remained confidential. See Vance, supra note
50; see also Ray, supra note 50, at 22 ("A mediator of powerful stature signals,
'You must respect me because you must care what I think about you. I cannot
issue a binding decision, but if you behave in such a way that you dishonor me,
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sized, but still relatively large, chapter 11 debtor may be unable to
attract a nationally prominent facilitator, but may be able to attract
a highly respected local figure to serve as facilitator. In contrast,
although a small business's financial distress may occasionally have
a significant enough role in the local community to attract the
interest of a prominent local figure, most small businesses will fail
to pique the interest of prominent national or local facilitators.
Consequently, a modified approach will be necessary to identify
appropriate facilitators.
First, an approach worth serious study would be the use of
established mediation experts. These mediators are often lawyers
and, if not chapter 11 experts, could perhaps be trained to mediate
the financial and legal issues that are likely to arise in plan
negotiations. Perhaps the United States Trustee ("U.S. Trustee")
could serve as a neutral advisor to the facilitator. Second, courts
might establish a panel of bankruptcy experts, who would undergo
mediation training, to serve as facilitators in small business cases.
Either of these approaches should be structured to recognize
that the success of facilitation depends not only on the parties'
respect for the mediator, but also on the facilitator's regard for his
or her own reputation. In prominent mega-cases, the facilitator's
success or failure is headline news.53 In small, no-news cases,
special care must be taken to ensure that facilitators have
incentives to succeed. One advantage of using professional
mediators is that maintaining a reputation for efficiency and
neutrality is already essential to professional mediators.' Any
panel experts should be chosen carefully to ensure their
because of my standing, you dishonor yourself."'); Eurotunnel Joue la Carte,
supra note 50, at 13; Eurotunnel S'en Remet, supra note 50, at 7F (noting that, at
the request of Eurotunnel, the President of the Tribunal de Commerce appointed
two prominent people, Robert Badinter and Lord Wakeham, as "mandataires ad
hoc" to mediate an accord among the parties (banks and 750,000 "actionaires");
their mission and strategy are confidential).
53. See In re R.H. Macy & Co., 152 B.R. 869; see also Vance, supra note 50;
Ray, supra note 52; Eurotunnel Joue la Carte, supra note 50; Eurotunnel S'en
Remet; supra note 50.
54. See generally The Cardozo Outline Journal of Conflict Resolution
(COJCR): The National Center for State Courts (NCSC): The Policy Consensus
Initiative (PCI), 1 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 4 (1999/2000).
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seriousness of purpose and regard for these same values. It will be
essential to avoid employing persons whose primary concern is
financial compensation and whose incentives may be inconsistent
with the objectives of facilitation.
Small businesses and their creditors can obtain some, but far
from all, of the benefits of the facilitator proposal under current
law. The legal tools exist for small businesses (or their creditors) to
request, and courts to appoint, mediators in chapter 11 cases
pending today.5 As previously noted, several bankruptcy courts
have appointed mediators to facilitate plan negotiations, as well as
to resolve claims disputes. 6 The debtor, or other party, need
simply request and justify the appointment under the applicable
mediation-authorizing procedures in the district (assuming
bankruptcy mediation is authorized). The request may be met
with greater enthusiasm by the court if it comes jointly from the
debtor and some substantial creditor or group of creditors.
A small business whose chapter 11 case is pending today, or is
filed tomorrow, can obtain all the benefits of mediation without
any changes in law. Parties in interest in chapter 11 cases cannot,
however, obtain all the benefits of the neutral facilitator proposal
without amendments to the Bankruptcy Code or Bankruptcy
Rules. SABRE urges legislation or rule changes to implement this
proposal for several reasons, including to make the use of
facilitators a regular and favored practice rather than an oddity,
enhance the clarity and uniformity of rules governing the
appointment of facilitators in bankruptcy cases, reduce the cost of
district-by-district and case-by-case rulemaking, and give courts
authority to grant facilitators power to file plans.
The current chapter 11 scheme does not allow a court to grant
a neutral entity authority to file a plan." The parties can obviate
55. FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 188-202.
56. See id. at 188-89.
57. The scope and authority for bankruptcy mediation and other forms of
bankruptcy ADR are well beyond the scope of this Article. For illumination, see
the sources and authors cited in FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 190-93 nn.46-51;
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN
ADR (2001).
5& See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 188-202.
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2000). The court's broad equitable and case
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this limitation to some degree by allowing one party to "sponsor" a
plan drafted by the facilitator (i.e., file the facilitator's plan in its
own name)." This would, of course, undermine a significant aspect
of the facilitator's leverage over all parties, but nothing more is
possible without new legislation.
C. Shared and Court Appointed Experts in Small Business
Reorganization Cases
SABRE Proposal:
NEUTRAL BUSINESS INFORMATION. Foster access to
neutral business information by requiring that the debtor and
its professionals share financial information with parties in
interest, and by enabling the court to appoint one (or more)
neutral business experts to conduct financial and other analyses
at estate expense. Parties in interest would be permitted to
engage separate experts at their own expense or, if such parties
satisfy the "substantial contribution" standard, at estate
61
expense.
This Proposal is designed to reduce the proliferation of
conflicting business experts by (i) ensuring that the debtor and its
professionals share neutral financial and business information with
all parties in interest, and (ii) replacing multiple, partisan, business
experts with court appointed, independent, business experts who
will generate neutral business and financial analyses that all parties
in interest may share.
The fundamental objective is that neutral, financial, and
management powers under section 105 would not appear to permit such action
because section 105 does not grant power inconsistent with express provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re PHM Credit Corp., 110 B.R. 284 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1990); Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Fishbach, 72 B.R. 245 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1987); In re Sec. & Energy Sys., Inc., 62 B.R. 676 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1986);
In re Pirsig Farms, Inc., 46 B.R. 237 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Sec. & Energy
Sys., Inc., 62 B.R. 676 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1986).
60. This assumes, of course, that a party would agree to accept the
responsibility of diligence, etc., imposed by Bankruptcy Code sections 1125 and
1129. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1129 (2000).
61. FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 202.
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business data and analyses that are relevant to the reorganization
should be available to all parties in interest. This objective must be
balanced, however, against the need to preserve the parties' ability
to retain separate experts when necessary to protect their interests.
The court is in the best position to determine how best to achieve
these objectives in each case.
In some cases, it may be necessary only to require that the
debtor provide to any official and unofficial committees, and any
party in interest who requests, all material, historical, current, and
projected financial data and analyses prepared by or for the debtor,
including by its accountants and other financial and business
experts and advisors.62
In other cases, it may be necessary to appoint one or more
neutral, independent, disinterested experts to generate data and
analyses. Independent business experts may be particularly
62. The Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rules, and U.S. Trustee's Office
impose various financial reporting requirements on the debtor. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1007, 2015, 4002; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(7), (8), 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)
(2000); U.S. Trustee Operating Manual, § 3-3.3, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/ustp-manual/vol3ch03.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
The parties in bankruptcy cases typically generate a great deal of additional
business and financial information that they typically do not share with other
parties. Financial and business analyses and recommendations that may be
required or useful in a case might include, without limitation: (i) financial
projections, (ii) industry analyses, (iii) market analyses, (iv) profit and loss
analyses, (v) whether the business is viable, (vi) whether the business should be
liquidated or reorganized, (vii) valuation analyses and development of
methodologies for valuation, (viii) analysis of financial information relevant to
whether related entities should be substantively consolidated, (ix) analysis and
valuation of assets and liabilities, (x) analysis of major claims that may impact
allocation of reorganization values, (xi) analysis of the debtor's business plan,
and (xii) analysis of the debtor's prospects for feasible reorganization. This
proposal targets this additional information.
To implement this Proposal, Congress might direct the U.S. Trustee (with
input from bankruptcy practitioners, judges, academics, and financial and
business experts) to develop national guidelines, criteria, and schedules
concerning the types of historical, current, and projected factual information that
should be made available to all parties. If the court so directs, the U.S. Trustee
could work with the parties in interest to develop specific schedules and
requirements in each case. The court would become involved if the parties were
unable to reach an accord on scheduling and disclosure.
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appropriate when the data are subject to interpretation, including
on issues such as valuation, feasibility, prospects for reorganization,
and the recommendation to liquidate or reorganize. In such cases,
the court, with the advice and recommendations of the debtor, any
creditors' committee or creditors' representative, and other parties
in interest, may appoint one (or more) neutral, independent,
disinterested, business experts to generate financial and other
business analyses that all parties in interest will share.
This Proposal, elaborated in the First Report, is designed to
address the proliferation of conflicting business experts by
fostering the shared use of neutral financial and business analyses
prepared by the debtor's experts and neutral, court-appointed
experts."
In large and "mega" cases, the court is likely to consider the
neutral expert concept primarily in the context of requests by the
debtor and one or more committees for authority to hire multiple,
estate-reimbursed accountants, investment bankers, consultants,
and other experts.
In small business cases, the frequent absence of an organized,
active creditors' committee, combined with the often considerable
expense of individual creditors hiring and paying their own
separate experts, may create an imbalance in which the only
"expert" analysis is provided by the debtor's potentially partisan
experts. In such cases, the need for open, generous sharing of
financial and other business analysis is critical. Such cases may
benefit greatly from the appointment of a single, neutral, non-
partisan, court-appointed expert.
Although SABRE recommends legislation or rulemaking to
provide clear standards and uniformity in the appointment of
neutral experts, and to make the appointment of neutral experts
the norm rather than the exception, most of the recommendations
of this proposal can be implemented under Bankruptcy Code
section 327,' Bankruptcy Code section 105,65 Federal Rule of
63. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 167, 202-03. The description of
Neutral Business Information to this point is drawn virtually word for word from
the FIRST REPORT.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000) (allowing the trustee, with court approval, to
employ professionals to assist the court in its duties).
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Evidence 706," and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9017,67
without new legislation or rules.
68




As part of SABRE's analysis preceding the First Report,
SABRE examined several issues relating to creditor participation
and the effectiveness of committees in chapter 11 cases. It
developed the following preliminary draft proposal that addresses
(i) the frequent absence of an organized creditor voice in small
business cases, and (ii) the potential for duplication and other
mischief in large cases with multiple committees. In the First
Report, SABRE deferred these issues for further analysis and to
determine whether additional empirical data might be
forthcoming.0  SABRE believed, however, that the first
component of this preliminary draft proposal7 could be of
particular importance in small business cases in which committees
often are not appointed, do not retain professionals, or otherwise
do not operate.
SABRE continues to evaluate the following draft proposal as
part of its ongoing project.
65. Id. § 105(a) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
66. FED. R. EvID. 706 (allowing federal courts to appoint expert witnesses).
67. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017 (incorporating the Federal Rules of Evidence in
Bankruptcy Code cases).
68. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 206-10 and accompanying notes.
69. This Section provides an overview of a draft of one proposal SABRE is
considering. If adopted, in this form or a modified form, this proposal may
appear in a subsequent SABRE report. This proposal is not yet complete and is
unpublished. The author is the SABRE Reporter, and therefore is able to
provide this overview.
70. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 168.
71. See infra Part III.B.
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B. The Draft Creditors' Representative Proposal'
At the outset of each chapter 11 case, the U.S. Trustee shall
determine and advise the court whether there is sufficient
creditor interest in forming a committee and whether a
committee is likely to be active and effective.
In cases in which no committee is appointed, the U.S. Trustee,
with court approval, shall appoint a creditors' representative to
monitor the case and negotiate plan and payment terms on
behalf of unsecured creditors, unless the court, for cause, orders
that a creditors' representative not be appointed.
1. Overview of Draft Proposal
This proposal addresses a distinct problem concerning the
effectiveness of committees in chapter 11 cases: the absence or
inactivity of committees in many, typically smaller, cases.
a. Overview: Will There Be a Committee?
At the outset of each chapter 11 case, the U.S. Trustee shall
determine and advise the court whether there is sufficient creditor
interest in forming a committee and whether a committee is likely
to be active and effective. This should obviate the current problem
of cases in which no creditors' interest monitors the debtor, and
will allow the court to determine, in each case, whether a creditors'
representative or a creditors' committee should be appointed.
b. Overview: Creditors' Representative
In cases in which no committee is appointed, the U.S. Trustee,
with court approval, shall73 appoint a creditors' representative to
72. SABRE welcomes comments on this proposal to Karen M. Gebbia-
Pinetti, Reporter, University of Hawai'i School of Law.
73. If no committee or creditors' representative is appointed, some might
suggest appointing the U.S. Trustee to perform the functions of a committee
under section 1103. Concerns would be raised, however, regarding how the U.S.
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perform some of the duties assigned to committees under
Bankruptcy Code section 1103(c) as are appropriate in the
particular case, unless the court for cause orders that no creditors'
representative be appointed. The creditors' representative shall
monitor the debtor to prevent abuses, mediate among divergent
creditor constituencies, protect the interests of creditors, negotiate
and/or draft a plan on behalf of creditors, be the creditors'
spokesperson, and if the court requests recommend whether the
case should be liquidated." The creditors' representative shall not
have an affirmative duty to investigate the debtor's conduct, assets,
liabilities, or financial condition. The order appointing the
creditors' representative shall specify the representative's specific
duties.
The U.S. Trustee shall establish a panel of qualified persons to
serve as creditors' representatives in chapter 11 cases. The U.S.
Trustee, with input from bankruptcy practitioners, judges, and
other bankruptcy professionals, shall establish and publish
qualifications for creditors' representatives and shall solicit
applicants. Criteria should include chapter 11 experience, financial
acumen, legal training, business experience, and other skills. The
panel should contain persons experienced in varied industries. The
creditors' representatives could be lawyers, accountants, or
Trustee could perform these functions without compromising its neutrality. It
would seem necessary to appoint a third party.
74. Proposed chapter 10, S. 540, discussed supra note 17, would have
eliminated the committee in small business cases and appointed a supervisory
trustee. Cf. Skeel, Markets, Courts, supra note 11, at 511-12 (recommending
separate chapters for closely and non-closely held businesses; proposing that a
creditor, rather than a neutral, should act as a representative of all creditors in
the same class in closely held business cases). In contrast, Bankruptcy Code
section 1102(a)(3), added in 1994, authorizes the court to dispense with the
committee in small business bankruptcy cases, but contains no provision for the
appointment of an alternative debtor monitor or creditor representative. 11
U.S.C. § 1102 (2000).
The U.S. Trustee might develop guidelines, with input from the bench,
trustees, practitioners and academics, concerning functions appropriate for
creditors' representatives, but allow the court flexibility in each case. For
example, the creditors' representative might monitor the case, arrive at
conclusions, inform its constituency, and negotiate to consensus, but be relieved
of the duty to investigate and take affirmative action. See id. § 1103(c)(2).
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business people. The selection process should favor multi-skilled
professionals with chapter 11 experience who may be able to
represent creditors' interests without retaining separate
professionals.
The appointment process will be similar, procedurally, to the
process for appointing a trustee." The creditor's representative
panel shall be separate and distinct from the chapter 7 trustee and
chapter 13 trustee panels; however, an individual may qualify to
serve on more than one such panel. If an individual is appointed to
serve as chapter 11 creditors' representative in a case that
subsequently is converted to chapter 7, however, that individual
may not serve as the chapter 7 trustee.
In cases in which no committee is appointed, the U.S. Trustee,
with court approval shall select a creditors' representative for each
case from the creditors' representative panel. The court shall have
discretion, however, based upon the needs of the case and the best
interests of creditors and the debtor, to approve the appointment
of a person who is not on the panel, if the appointee meets the
qualifications established for creditors' representatives.
The court shall determine, based upon the scope of the
representative's duties and the circumstances of each case, whether
the creditors' representative will be allowed to retain counsel and
other professionals. The court may require the representative or
its professionals, if any, to present a budget to the U.S. Trustee
before commencing work. A program for the compensation of the
creditors' representative and its professionals (if appointed) shall
be developed by the U.S. Trustee with input from bankruptcy
practitioners, judges, and other bankruptcy professionals. If
appropriate, the U.S. Trustee might develop two or more pilot
programs that employ divergent payment programs, each of which
is implemented in several districts, in order to gather data and
determine the comparative effectiveness of the divergent programs
in enhancing representation of creditors and monitoring of the
debtor without unwarranted cost. The creditors' representative's
fees and expenses, and those of its court-appointed professionals, if
any, will be paid as an administrative expense on the same priority
75. Id. §§ 321-323 (outlining the eligibility, qualifications, and role of court
appointed trustees).
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as the fees of professionals hired under Bankruptcy Code section
327.76
The U.S. Trustee shall gather and publicly report appropriate
data concerning the effectiveness of the creditors' representative
program, in each judicial district and nationwide. This report shall
compile and compare data from cases in which creditors'
representatives and committees are appointed, and might include
factors such as: the number of cases in which creditors'
representatives and committees are appointed; the size of cases in
which creditors' representatives and committees are appointed; the
relative fees and other costs associated with creditors'
representatives and committees; the time to confirmation; the
percentage of cases confirmed, dismissed, and converted; the
circumstances in which creditors' representatives and committees
are appointed; factors that contribute to the lack of creditor
interest in forming committees; composition and experience of
creditors' representative panels; number of cases in which
creditors' representatives are selected other than from the panel;
circumstances that warrant appointing representatives other than
from the panel, etc.
2. Analysis of Draft Proposal
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code' fundamentally altered pre-Code
reorganization practice by reducing the need for judicial
intervention and implementing a private bargaining system in
which the parties' agreement to the terms of the plan,
supplemented by a few, critical, minimum treatment standards,
largely governs the reorganization process.78 The official creditors'
76. See id. § 327.
77. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended primarily at 11
U.S.C.).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N.
5963, 6049 (stating that bankruptcy judges would no longer perform a supervisory
function over cases but would concentrate on judicial duties); see also Marta G.
Andrews, The Chapter 11 Creditors' Committee: Statutory Watchdog?, 2 BANKR.
DEV. J. 247, 264 (1985) (stating that a "major legislative goal of the Code was to
decrease the administrative responsibilities of bankruptcy judges so that they
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could function as impartial arbiters of disputes between the debtor and its
creditors"); Mark J. Krudys, Insider Trading by Members of Creditors'
Committees - Actionable!, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 99, 103 n.12 (1994) (noting that
the Bankruptcy Code "significantly altered the function of creditors' committees
from that enumerated under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,"
primarily by shifting the burden of overseeing the debtor from the bankruptcy
judge to the creditors' committee); Dennis S. Meir & Theodore Brown, Jr.,
Representing Creditors' Committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56
AM. BANKR. L.J. 217, 217 (1982) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code reflects
Congress's intention that bankruptcy judges serve a strictly judicial role, and that
creditors' committees monitor debtors' activities; also suggesting that active and
aggressive creditors' committees can significantly impact the course of a chapter
11 case); Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of
the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the
Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 431-32, 439 (1995) (noting
that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code gave power and responsibility for formulating a
reorganization plan to the debtor with appropriate oversight and input from the
creditors' committee; suggesting a recent trend in which bankruptcy judges have
exercised increasing oversight, but arguing that leaving negotiations to creditors
and debtors is better); Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of the
Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 1329,
1339-41 (1993) (noting that, under the Bankruptcy Code, judges no longer take
an active role supervising cases but delegate this responsibility to creditors and a
U.S. Trustee); Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Law, supra note 11, at 35 (noting
that the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code relegated judges to a strictly
judicial role and prohibited them from attending the first meeting of creditors);
see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129(a) (2000); First Merchs. Acceptance Corp. v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 395, 403 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing committee's role in
negotiating the plan and monitoring the debtor); In re Western Pacific Airlines,
Inc., 219 B.R. 575, 577-78 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (discussing committee's
"watchdog" role); Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1240 (3d
Cir. 1994), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (1994) ("Under the 1978
Act, the courts have been relieved of most administrative matters, and the
responsibility for monitoring the operations of the debtor and its compliance with
appropriate bankruptcy procedures has fallen largely to the creditors' committee
(although the U.S. Trustee has some role)."); In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 91
B.R. 813, 818 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code
clearly envisioned a prominent role for creditors' committees in the
reorganization process."); In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 689 F.2d 445, 455-56
(W.D. Pa. 1982) (discussing committee's broad role); In re Daig Corp., 17 B.R.
41, 43 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (stating:
The creditors' committee is not merely a conduit through whom the debtor
speaks to and negotiates with creditors generally. On the contrary, it is
purposely intended to represent the necessarily different interests and concerns
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committee is a critical component of this structure. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, the committee is designed to counterbalance the
power conferred on the debtor,79 to consolidate creditors' multiple
voices into one strong bargaining force, and to ensure adequate
creditor representation.' The existence of an official committee
gives creditors a sense of participation as well as a real opportunity
to participate in the progress of the case and the formulation of the
plan, either directly by committee membership, or indirectly by
communicating with committee members.81
of the creditors it represents. It must necessarily be adversarial in a sense,
though its relation with the debtor may be supportive and friendly. There is
simply no other entity established by the Code to guard those interests. The
committee as the sum of its members is not intended to be merely an arbiter but
a partisan which will aid, assist, and monitor the debtor pursuant to its own self-
interest.);
In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 9 B.R. 941, 944 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting the
committee has a "wide and important array of authority and responsibility... the
Bankruptcy Code contemplates a significant and central role for the committee in
the scheme of a business reorganization"); GEORGE M. TRIESTER ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 397 (1996).
79. This power includes the presumption that the debtor will remain in
possession and will have an exclusive period in which to propose a plan. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108, 1121 (2000).
80. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 401 (1977) (legislative history of section
1102) (stating:
This section provides for the appointment of creditors' and equity holders'
committees, which will be the primary negotiating bodies for the formulation of
the plan of reorganization. They will represent the various classes of creditors
and equity security holders from which they are selected. They will also
provide supervision of the debtor in possession and the trustee, and will protect
their constituents' interests.);
see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
81. Andrews, supra note 78, at 248-49 (arguing that, through the creditors'
committee, creditors have an opportunity to play "consultative, investigatory,
participatory, supervisory, and service-oriented" roles); see also Andrew
DeNatale et al., Powers, Functions and Duties of Creditors' Committees, 767
PLI/CoMM. 791, 802 (1998) (arguing that, through the creditors' committee, "the
interests of all constituents can be represented, and each constituent can enjoy
the benefits of an active, organized, and official advocate, without actively
participating in the process," which allows participation by creditors who would
otherwise be unable to have a voice in the process); J. Bradley Johnston, The
Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 270 (1991) (arguing that the
creditors' committee facilitates, rather than discourages, coalition building, and
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The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that a committee shall be
appointed in every chapter 11 case (unless, as amended in 1994, the
debtor is a small business and the court, on request of a party in
interest, finds "cause" not to appoint a committee). 82
The idealized vision of self-monitoring chapter 11 cases in
which active yet restrained committees serve as an equal counter-
balance to the debtor has not been realized. Instead, committees
frequently play an insignificant or non-existent role in small
chapter 11 cases. Consequently, if the drafters' vision is to be
achieved, it will be necessary to address the problems that arise
from the absence of committees in many cases. This will require
that the current committees either be reformed or replaced by an
entity that can perform the critical roles expected of committees.
This proposal seeks to accomplish this objective by filling the gap
in cases in which committees are not active.
a. Analysis: Will There Be a Committee?
The essential first step is the development of a simple process
by which the court, with input from a neutral entity (the U.S.
Trustee), can determine in which cases a committee is likely to be
formed and to serve effectively.
This proposal seeks to accomplish this goal by building upon
the existing structure, under which the U.S. Trustee appoints
enables unsecured creditors to speak with one voice; "[b]y using creditors'
committees, the bargaining difficulties inherent in consolidating the interests of
numerous unsecured creditors is simplified, and the unsecured creditors'
bargaining power enhanced, by effectively treating unsecured creditors as one
bargaining entity with a single bargaining agenda"); Meir & Brown, supra note
78, at 217 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code reflects Congress' intent that
bankruptcy judges serve a strictly judicial role and that creditors' committees
monitor the debtor's activities; suggesting that active and aggressive creditors'
committees can significantly impact the course of a chapter 11 case); Miller, supra
note 78, at 448-49 (arguing that creditors' committees provide representation for
both sophisticated lenders and small trade and individual creditors); see also H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 401 (1977) (legislative history of section 1102 quoted supra
note 80).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(3) (2000); cf. In re Haskell-Dawes, Inc., 188 B.R. 515,
520-21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding no "cause" to forego committee
appointment).
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members of creditors' committees. At the outset of each chapter
11 case, the U.S. Trustee will determine and advise the court
whether a committee is likely to be effective in the case.
b. Analysis: Creditors' Reresentative
Although the Bankruptcy Code contemplates that active
committees will monitor the debtor, negotiate a plan, and serve
other roles in chapter 11 cases, there are many (typically smaller)
cases in which committees are not appointed, do not operate or
participate in the case, or do not hire counsel or other
professionals."
83. See, e.g., In re ABC Auto. Prods. Corp., 210 B.R. 437, 442-43 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. .1997) (discussing why creditors are not interested in serving on
committees; "as court and commentators alike have noted, in many cases
creditors' committees are inactive or ineffectual"); In re Aspen Limousine Serv.,
Inc., 187 B.R. 989, 994 n.6 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (noting that "[in practice, a
committee is rarely appointed in a smaller case"); In re Spruill, 78 B.R. 766, 772
n.14 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987) ("[M]ost creditors' committees in this district are
totally inactive and ineffective"); In re B&W Tractor, 38 B.R. 613, 615 n.4
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (noting that less than five percent of cases in the district
have active creditors' committees); In re Coast Carloading Co., 34 BR. 855, 859
n.3 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) ("Indeed, the Code seems to mandate the
appointment of a committee, although in practice it is sometimes impossible to
get people to serve."); In re Gusam Rest. Corp., 32 B.R. 832, 834 n.1 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[I]n too many cases where creditors' committees are formed,
the creditors' committees exist in name only and are completely ineffectual"
(quoting In re Nikron, Inc., 27 B.R. 773, 776 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)), rev'd on
other grounds, 737 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984); see also RICHARD I. AARON,
BANKRUPrCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 4.06 (1992) (noting that there is little
incentive for creditors to participate on a committee); Robert C. Aronoff,
Appointing and Organizing Official Creditors' Committees with Model By-Laws,
20 CAL. BANKR. J. 289, 290 (1992) ("[S]tudies have shown the Creditors'
Committees are often ineffective."); Peter C. Blain & Diane Harrison O'Gawa,
Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code:
Creation, Composition, Powers and Duties, 73 MARO. L. REv. 581, 581-82 (1990)
(" [I]n the majority of chapter 11 cases, creditors' committees have fallen short of
Congress' initial expectations and have failed to utilize the broad powers
available to them."); Blum, supra note 2, at 200 (noting that:
because unsecured creditors in smaller cases typically have too small a stake in
the case to make it worthwhile to incur the expense and trouble of participating
in a creditors' committee, they tend to be apathetic and uninvolved. Even
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The absence of active committees in these cases may lead to a
gap or vacuum in monitoring, inadequate creditor input in the plan
process, excessive debtor control and leverage, increased delay and
where they do make the effort to participate in the committee, lack of financing
may make the committee ineffective in controlling the debtor. As a result, this
check on the debtors' actions has proven to be largely ornamental.);
Arthur B. Federman, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 51 J. Mo. B. 105, 107
(1995) (questioning whether the power to dispense with creditors' committees in
small business cases under section 1102 will have much impact because
committees are rarely appointed in small cases anyway); Joseph Guzinski & Lynn
M. LoPucki, Study of Rates of Formation of Committees (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law)
(reporting results of a study based upon Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee
data and a questionnaire circulated to all U.S. Trustee's Offices seeking data for
the period July 1996 to June 1997; finding low committee formation rate);
Michael J. Herbert, Business Reorganizations under Chapter 13: Some Second
Thoughts, 10 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 603, 630 (1985) (stating that:
it is often difficult to get creditors to agree to serve on a creditors' committee if
the case is small. The reason is simple. The claims themselves are generally
small and the time and effort required for effective creditor committee service
is rarely determined worthwhile. This apathy may also make it relatively easy
for the plan to be approved, since most creditors who bother to vote on it are
likely to take whatever they can get.);
Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the
Trustee System, 70 MARO. L. REv. 159, 165, 174, 183, 191 (1987) (reporting the
results of a study of forty-eight cases in the Eastern District of Wisconsin during
1982 that showed a correlation between the size of cases and opposition by
creditors; arguing that the reasons for inadequate creditor control include: (1)
creditors' committees failed to operate; (2) creditor opposition flourished in cases
that were likely to succeed but creditors did not effectively organize to close non-
viable business; (3) non-debtor plans provided no realistic control; (4) trustees
and examiners were seldom used to investigate viability; and (5) preferences
were not attacked); Miller, supra note 13, at 450 (noting that creditors'
committees are either not appointed or not active in many cases; noting that
there is little oversight of the debtor in cases with no active committee and no
active secured creditor or other large creditor; stating that the committee "often
fails to live up to its role"); Stephen J. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay
and Expense in Chapter 11, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 309-11 (1993) (arguing that
"inactive and ineffectual" creditors' committees fail to perform any management
function in chapter 11 cases and contribute to delay); Small, supra note 5, at 320-
21 (noting that, "in most cases, unsecured creditors are apathetic and creditors'
committees ineffective, particularly in smaller chapter 11 cases."); Young &
Bohm, supra note 14, at 470-72 (noting that creditors' committees are rarely
appointed in small business cases).
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costs that flow from the debtor being forced to negotiate with
individual creditors rather than with a single, organized group of
creditors, and increased time and cost of chapter 11 that flow from
the debtor engaging in delay tactics. Finally, inadequate creditor
input may allow the debtor to confirm a plan that provides
creditors with less than they would have received with more
vigorous representation."
If no Committee is appointed, the Bankruptcy Code provides
no alternative monitor or organized creditor voice. The bankruptcy
laws do give the U.S. Trustee some role in monitoring the debtor
and the case; 5 however, in practice, the U.S. Trustee tends to be a
monitor of last resort." It rarely steps in to seek conversion or
dismissal unless the debtor has failed to file required reports or the
case has languished for a lengthy period and shows no prospect of
confirmation. '  The U.S. Trustee's role does not replicate the
committee's role because the U.S. Trustee is a neutral observer,
not an advocate for creditors.' Moreover, neither the U.S. Trustee
nor any other entity is designated to fulfill the committee's duties
when there is no committee. The U.S. Trustee plays a more
84. See J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
213, 270 (1991) (arguing that the creditors' committee facilitates coalition
building, and enables unsecured creditors to speak with one voice "[b]y using
creditors' committees, the bargaining difficulties inherent in consolidating the
interests of numerous unsecured creditors is simplified, and the unsecured
creditors' bargaining power enhanced, by effectively treating unsecured creditors
as one bargaining entity with a single bargaining agenda"); see also Raymond T.
Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary
Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1989)
(arguing that unsecured creditors committees "can play an active, advisory role
and influence the direction of the case").
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2000) (imposing on the U.S. Trustee the duties to
review fee applications, monitor plans and disclosure statements in chapter 11
cases, ensure that reports and schedules are timely filed, monitor creditors'
committees, notify the United States Attorney of acts that may constitute crimes,
monitor cases, and take action to avoid delay, among other duties).
86. Accord Joseph Guzinski, Comments at the Eugene P. and Delia S.
Murphy Conference of Corporate Law, Fordham University School of Law
(Nov. 15, 2001); Joseph Guzinski, Response: Small Business Reorganization and
the SABRE Proposals, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L., 295 (2002).
87. Accord Comments of Joseph Guzinski, supra note 86.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(2).
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substantive monitoring role only when the U.S. Trustee serves as
trustee, not when the case lacks a committee.89
The reasons committees do not operate in many chapter 11
cases probably vary from case to case and involve some
combination of apathy, creditors having little at stake, the debtor
having few unencumbered assets from which to make distributions
or compensate committee professionals, creditor interests being
highly fragmented, and individual creditor claims being so small
that few unsecured creditors can justify the time and expense of
serving on a committee.'
If payment of the committee's expenses by the estate was
designed to ensure creditor participation, it has not worked. The
percentage of cases in which committees are formed is small and
probably has declined since the early years of the Bankruptcy
Code.9 In small cases, the creditors may be less able to pay the
expenses of monitoring the case. Even if they are wealthy
creditors, they may be unwilling to monitor a small case in which
their stake is small and their chances of receiving a distribution are
low. Consequently, it is not clear whether the incentive of
compensation by the estate affects creditors' determination to be
actively involved in a case. Data are not readily available on these
questions.
This proposal contemplates that the creditors' representative
would be appointed to perform the monitoring, plan negotiating,
and fulfill certain other roles of the committee in certain cases in
which no committee is appointed.' Under this proposal, the court
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., In re ABC Auto. Prods. Corp., 210 B.R. 437, 442-43 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing reasons for creditors' decisions not to serve on
committees); Karen Gross & Patricia Redmond, In Defense of Debtor
Exclusivity: Assessing Four of the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69
AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 292-304, 308 (1995) (arguing that the main cause of delay
and cost is not exclusivity but creditor apathy, especially in medium and small
cases).
91. See sources cited supra note 83.
92. For example, the creditors' representative might assist the court in
determining, early in a case, whether the business should be liquidated or
reorganized. Cf. Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganization:
Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REv. 581, 584-92, 621-34, 611-21
(1993) (citing studies regarding low confirmation rates (Stripp, supra note 78 and
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would determine in each case whether the circumstances of the
case warrant the appointment of a creditors' representative or
whether some other method of monitoring the debtor and
protecting creditors would be appropriate (such as an active major
creditor, or the appointment of a neutral business and financial
expert).
In recent years, several bankruptcy experts have
recommended reforms designed to enhance the effectiveness of
committees or fill the gap in cases in which committees are not
active or effective.93 For example, the NBRC has proposed giving
the court more oversight and control over committee membership
Jensen-Conklin, supra note 13); arguing that filings by companies that will
eventually liquidate drive up the costs of bankruptcy; advocating replacing
debtor in possession managers with trustees and establishing a methodology to
help the trustee determine whether a company should continue in chapter 11 or
be liquidated; proposing that management continue to make "business activity
decisions" such as the use of assets and day-to-day business operations, but that
the trustee make "fundamental bankruptcy decisions" such as mediating plan
negotiations, shaping the tone and character of settlement discussions, allocating
losses, and assessing the viability and validity of the reorganization; suggesting
that the U.S. Trustee choose the trustee from a panel of qualified applicants with
experience in the debtor's industry or business; recommending that the main task
of the trustee would be to determine whether to liquidate or reorganize the
company and that the U.S. Trustee and court would review the trustee's decisions
to ensure that the trustee is not continuing the business simply out of self-
interest; proposing a methodology to assist the trustee in making the decision to
liquidate or reorganize; considers and compares value-based and process-based
approaches; reviewing history of chapter 11, including allocation of control and
decision-making, as context for the proposal, and discussing existing balances in
the Bankruptcy Code and how these would be affected by the proposal); Tabb,
The Future of Chapter 11, supra note 11, at 859 (arguing that time and money are
lost in cases before hopeless debtors are eventually liquidated, that an
independent third party should be brought in to analyze feasibility of the debtor,
that such a person can make an objective assessment that many of these cases
should be liquidated earlier rather than later, and that the cost savings derived
from earlier termination would offset the cost outlay involved in hiring the
independent party); see also Kerkman, supra note 83, at 165, 183, 191 (showing a
correlation between size of cases and opposition by creditors; concluding that
creditors are unable to close non-viable businesses, creditors can rarely change
management, debtors can dictate terms of plan, and debtors can obtain
significant delays).
93. See infra notes 94-99.
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to ensure adequate representation.9" Professor Edward Adams has
suggested that the debtor remain in possession to operate the
business, but a non-operating trustee be appointed in every chapter
11 case to make "fundamental bankruptcy decisions" such as an
assessment of plan feasibility and of the debtor's viability.95
Professor Tabb and others have proposed the appointment of an
independent monitor in chapter 11 cases.96 Messrs. Blain and
O'Gawa have recommended that the U.S. Trustee develop
guidelines to help committees perform their duties more
effectively. ' Professor Gross and Messrs. Curtin and Togut have
proposed that the U.S. Trustee assist bankruptcy professionals in
developing effective monitoring techniques, the Bankruptcy Code
be amended to embody an early testing of feasibility or viability,
and additional studies be undertaken.98  Judge Paskay has
94. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 455, 492-501.
95. See Adams, supra note 92, at 621-24.
96. See Evan D. Flaschen, Independent Monitors in Chapter 11, 4 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 514, 515 (1996) (proposing that the court appoint an
independent monitor in all chapter 11 cases); Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in
Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARO. L. REv. 159,
197 (1987) (arguing for greater use of examiners and trustees to investigate the
debtor and reduce debtor control); Gerald K. Smith, Reorganizations, 1995 ANN.
SURV. BANKR. L. 605, 622-30 (1995) (discussing appointment of an independent
trustee); Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, supra note 11, at 854-59 (considering
whether courts should appoint a trustee or independent examiner in every case);
Barry L. Zaretsky, Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REv. 907,
907-42 (1993) (arguing that the appointment of an independent third party
provides a benefit from intervention without incurring the costs, or creating the
disruption, of a trustee, and that the third party may defuse tensions by mediating
plan negotiations or other disputes, assist the debtor with management or
reorganization decisions, or perform other tasks that can best be accomplished by
a party unconnected with any of the constituencies in the case).
97. Blain & O'Gawa, supra note 83, at 581 (noting that Congress relieved the
court of administrative burdens in the hopes that creditors' committees would
take a more active role in the day to day administration and monitoring of
chapter 11 cases, but finding that, in the majority of cases, the committees have
failed; suggesting that the U.S. Trustee system and the increasing awareness by
creditors of the role and power of committees might alter this, and developing
guidelines for committees to follow so their statutory powers are used
effectively).
98. Timothy J. Curtin et al., Debtors Out-of-Control: A Look at Chapter 11's
Check and Balance System, 1988 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 87, 87-89, 91-94
2002] SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION
recommended eliminating the committee requirement and
disclosure requirement in small business cases."
Earlier studies have also recommended that some sort of
independent monitor oversee chapter 11 cases, such that the
creditors' committee is not responsible for all aspects of monitoring
the debtor." For example, The Brookings Institute Study
recommended that an administrative agency, rather than the
bankruptcy judges, oversee administration and monitoring.'' The
1973 Commission on the Administration of the Bankruptcy Laws
also urged the development of a bankruptcy administrative
agency."°
(reporting the results of a survey of bankruptcy judges; noting that the "ideal"
chapter 11 envisioned by the drafters "was an expeditious proceeding in which
relatively evenly-matched parties, the debtor and its creditors, strove to
reorganize an ailing business in a manner that would fairly recognize the
competing interests of all;" concluding that the bifurcation of administrative and
judicial functions had led to gaps in monitoring; finding that members of the
bankruptcy community perceive a problem relating to abuses made possible due
to the limited role of committees and excessive control by the debtor).
99. See Alexander L. Paskay, Reorganizing Single Asset Real Estate, 4 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 538, 540 (1996) (proposing the elimination of (1) the
requirement that an unsecured creditors' committee be appointed in single asset
cases, and (2) the requirement that the debtor file a disclosure statement in small
and single asset cases). The small business amendments passed by Congress in
1994 adopted a similar approach. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, § 217, 108 Stat. 4106, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (authorizing the
court to forego appointing a creditors' committee in a small business case); §
1121(e) (shortening the exclusivity period in small business cases); § 1125(f)
(providing for conditional* approval of disclosure statement in small business
cases); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1020 (allowing a business that meets the small
business definition to elect small business treatment).
100. See infra notes 101-102.
101. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS,
PROCESS, REFORM 199 (1971) (proposing the creation of a bankruptcy agency in
the executive branch to perform certain functions then performed by the court,
trustees, receivers, appraisers, accountants, auctioneers, and auxiliary personnel;
arguing that a separate agency would increase efficiency because it would receive
pressure from the executive offices and would be aided by such executive offices
as the Office of Management and Budget and the Civil Service Commission).
102. COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION, 1973 REPORT 2-3, 19-
21, 115, 132-33 (1973) (proposing that Congress create a Bankruptcy
Administration, primarily to oversee liquidations and provide consumer
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Although their recommendations vary, the authors of these
proposals generally recognize two goals: the need for adequate
monitoring of the debtor and the desire for a private system in
which debtor and creditors actively negotiate and solve their
restructuring disputes with little governmental regulatory
interference. The creditors' representative proposal captures the
essence of these concepts in its recommendation that a creditors'
representative perform the committee's role in many of the large
number of case in which no committee is active.
The creditor's representative may add nominal costs to the
case. These costs should be offset, however, by cost savings
accrued from reducing the number of creditors with whom the
debtor must negotiate, and reducing the potential for delay and
abuse that can occur when the debtor has unchecked control over
the case. 3
C. Implementation
Under the current Bankruptcy Code, there is no provision that
expressly permits the court to appoint a creditors' representative.
Although a court might attempt to achieve the same types of
benefits through a carefully defined appointment of an examiner,
expert, or consultant, and the U.S. Trustee can play a monitoring
role, each of these entities is designed to serve as a neutral voice.
None can provide a legitimate, creditor-oriented, debtor-balancing
voice in the case. Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code will be
counseling; noting that the bankruptcy judges would resolve controversies;
suggesting the system would require either federal funding or funding through
bankruptcy fees; arguing that an administrator is required because there is no
real creditor control; noting that this results in excessive costs and serious abuses;
noting that the Donovan Report in 1929 identified these same problems, and that
this proposal is somewhat similar to the Donovan Report proposal; noting similar
concepts in other countries; noting that the Brookings Institute Report argued
that the use of a judicial mechanism to solve administrative matters raised costs
and delay and did not promote the objectives of bankruptcy).
103. See Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, supra note 11, at 854-61 (arguing that
an independent trustee may add costs but these costs would be offset by reducing
delay attributable to extensive debtor exclusivity and reducing unwarranted
reallocations between different categories of claimants; noting that an
independent trustee has only one goal, to maximize the value of the estate).
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required to implement this proposal.
IV. REPLY TO MR. GuZINSKI RESPONSE
In his thoughtful Response: Small Business Reorganization and
the SABRE Proposals,'' Mr. Guzinski °5 suggests that SABRE's
proposals to employ Plan Facilitators and Neutral Business
Experts"° in chapter 11 cases"° "do not deal with.., the time and
expense of Chapter 11"'" but "aim at another, more deep-seated
problem in chapter 11. This problem is often described in terms of
'time and expense,' but is something more fundamental: the fact
that our adversarial model of litigation in some ways does not serve
the reorganization process."'' 9 Mr. Guzinski correctly concludes
that the Plan Facilitator and Neutral Business Expert proposals
address deficiencies in the adversarial process, as it functions in
chapter 11 cases with active creditors.
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code" vested creditors with
extensive rights to monitor and counterbalance powerful debtors."'
SABRE and others have concluded, however, that the powers
104. Guzinski, supra note 86.
105. Joseph A. Guzinski, Acting General Counsel, Executive Office for U.S.
Trustees.
106. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 167, 185-210.
107. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2000).
108. Guzinski, supra note 86, at 295. Mr. Guzinski also suggests that the
SABRE First Report does not present evidence that time and cost is a problem.
Id. at 296-97. In fact, the SABRE First Report sets forth extensive discussion of
the debate concerning the extent to which time and cost are a concern in chapter
11 cases. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 211-41. Moreover, although there
is some evidence that the time businesses spend in chapter 11 has decreased
Guzinski, supra note 86, at 296 & n.13, there is also evidence that the time in
chapter 11 for all but the very largest cases has increased. See FIRST REPORT,
supra note 21, at 216 (citing Professor LoPucki's study of time in chapter 11).
109. Guzinski, supra note 86, at 297.
110. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101- 1330 (2000).
111. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 196-97; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1109
(granting creditors extensive rights to appear and be heard as parties in interest);
§ 1107 (setting forth the rights, powers and duties of the debtor in possession); §
1121 (granting the debtor an exclusive period in which to file and obtain
confirmation of a plan of reorganization).
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granted to both debtor and creditors may increase cost and delay in
chapter 11 by establishing an overly adversarial atmosphere that
discourages parties from sharing neutral business information,
encourages unnecessary litigation of routine matters, and fosters
strategic behavior in plan negotiations. '12 The Plan Facilitator and
Neutral Business Expert proposals seek to moderate this
atmosphere by adapting to the chapter 11 bargaining process the
same types of neutrals that other courts traditionally employ (i.e.,
independent experts and mediators). As in other courts, the use of
neutrals is designed to reduce the cost and delay associated with
unnecessary litigation."'
Mr. Guzinski also suggests that the Plan Facilitator and
Neutral Business Expert are "intended to deal with the
shortcomings of creditor representation in Chapter 11 cases."".4
This conclusion is misplaced. The Plan Facilitator and Neutral
Business Expert are not designed to solve shortcomings of creditor
representation. Rather, they address the problems that arise from
undesirable adversarial incentives of all parties, including debtor,
creditors, and equity holders. They are designed to maintain the
current system in which both the debtor and creditor have
extensive powers to protect their interests, but to make that system
more cooperative and less adversarial.
Although the Plan Facilitator and Neutral Business Expert are
not designed to address deficiencies in creditor representation,
SABRE has identified certain failures of creditor representation in
chapter 11 cases, and is analyzing means of addressing those
failures."5  Particularly, the available empirical and anecdotal
evidence suggests that, despite Congress's intent that active
112. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 199-200.
113. SABRE is continuing to analyze the extent to which the burdens and
duties that the Bankruptcy Code places upon creditors' committees (see 11
U.S.C. § 1102) may foster unnecessary litigation by compelling committees to
analyze and litigate routine motions in order to prevent accusations that the
committee is failing to represent its constituencies' interests zealously.
Additional proposed ieforms addressing this problem may appear in a
subsequent SABRE Report.
114. Guzinski, supra note 86, at 295.
115. Any proposals to address these deficiencies would appear in a subsequent
SABRE report.
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committees would monitor and counterbalance the debtor in
chapter 11 cases, committees are not active in most chapter 11
cases."6 The preliminary draft Creditors' Representative proposal,
set forth in the Article, may provide a means of addressing this
concern. 17  Under this proposal, the U.S. Trustee, with court
approval, would appoint a Creditor's Representative to negotiate
on behalf of unsecured creditors in many cases in which no
committee is active."8 As noted in the SABRE First Report"9 and
the draft Proposal,20 SABRE continues to analyze the available
data and refine this proposal for possible inclusion in a subsequent
SABRE report.
Mr. Guzinski correctly notes that the U.S. Trustee may play a
role in reducing time and cost in cases in which creditors are not
active."' If the case is languishing without any prospect for
reorganization, and there is no active creditor voice, the U.S.
Trustee can move for dismissal or the appointment of a trustee.'
The U.S. Trustee cannot, however, negotiate a plan on behalf of
creditors in such cases. Similarly, in cases in which creditors are
active, the U.S. Trustee cannot mediate plan negotiations or
generate neutral business and financial data. The Creditors'
Representative, neutral Plan Facilitator, and Neutral Business
Expert are designed to fill these gaps, which are not filled by the
U.S. Trustee.
SABRE believes that the cost savings associated with the
Federal Workout Proceeding, Plan Facilitator and Neutral
Business Experts, together with the incidental improvements these
reforms will make to the bankruptcy system, will exceed any costs
associated with implementing these proposals.
116. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 231.
117. See supra Part III.
118. See id.
119. See FIRST REPORT, supra note 21, at 233.
120. See supra pp. 283-90.
121. Guzinski, supra note 86, at 298; see also 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(G) (2000).
122. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1112 (2000).
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